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WTO Dispute Settlement and the Appellate
Body: Insider Perceptions and Members’
Revealed Preferences
Matteo FIORINI*, Bernard M. HOEKMAN**, Petros C. MAVROIDIS***, Maarja
SALUSTE**** & Robert WOLFE*****
The WTO dispute settlement system is in crisis, following the decision of the United States to
block new appointments to the Appellate Body (AB). The AB went into hibernation in
December 2019, not having enough sitting members to be able to operate. What do WTO
members think of the performance of WTO dispute settlement? How much do WTO members
care about the existence and operation of an appeals mechanism? In this article, we report on the
results of a survey of WTO Members’ perceptions of the AB and the role it plays (should play).
We complement this with data on Members’ revealed preferences in their use of the dispute
settlement system, their intervention in WTO debates on the AB crisis and their responses to
demise of the AB. The data reveal strong support for the basic design of the dispute settlement
system but also that the United States is not alone in perceiving that the AB went beyond its
mandate. There are substantive questions that need to be addressed if the Appellate Body
impasse is to be resolved.
Keywords: WTO, Appellate Body, dispute settlement, conflict resolution

1 INTRODUCTION
The WTO dispute settlement system is in crisis, endangering the future of the
organization. The proximate reason for alarm is the hibernation of the Appellate
Body (AB) after the United States blocked new appointments as the terms of sitting
members expired. As a result, on 11 December 2019 the AB became effectively
defunct, as two of the three remaining members reached the end of their term,
making it impossible for the AB to consider appeals.
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In this article, we ask how WTO Members regard the AB and the role it plays
(should play). More specifically, we ask a series of interconnected questions aiming
to illuminate the attitudes of the WTO membership towards the AB. It is not only
views on the AB per se that we are interested in. More generally, our aim is to
better understand whether, in light of the experience with the AB, the WTO
membership believes that an appeals mechanism as established in the DSU (Dispute
Settlement Understanding) is necessary for de-politicized resolution of trade conflicts. We ask the following questions:
-

-

-

Is the AB dispute a self-contained one that centres narrowly on the
operation of the AB, as opposed to a reflection of broader dissatisfaction with WTO dispute settlement?
Is the AB fight a tempest in a small teapot affecting primarily a
small group of large countries and major exporters distracting
attention from ways to manage conflict in the trading system that
are potentially more valuable?
Does the trade policy community think the AB has delivered on
their expectations?
Do Members regard the importance of dispute settlement in the
same way?
Our research suggests that many WTO Members may not consider
the AB fight to be one they are directly concerned with. This is
not surprising given extensive research in political science and
economics on the incentives for countries to use the WTO dispute
settlement system. One would expect frequent users of DS (dispute
settlement) to be the main protagonists in debates about keeping
the AB operational, as the AB demise has direct consequences on
the prospects of bringing and winning cases. In this vein, we first
consider Members’ revealed preferences in their use of the dispute
settlement system and their interventions in WTO debates about
the AB crisis. We complement the data on participation in the
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) (either as complainants and/or
respondents, or in the realm of WTO debates on the AB crisis)
with an original survey of practitioners and knowledgeable observers on their perceptions of WTO dispute settlement that we
conducted in 2019. This provides new information on the views
of governments regarding WTO DS, as well as those of practitioners and stakeholders who are directly involved in or affected by
WTO DS. These data reveal a split among the ‘frequent flyers’.
Many of the WTO Members that use dispute settlement most
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intensely participated actively in DSB discussions on the AB, but
some did not, suggesting that not all major users of the DS system
were equally concerned to retain the AB ‘as is’.
The plan of the article is as follows. Section 1 presents our hypotheses and the
survey methodology. Section 2 describes the data used. Section 3 discusses patterns
of ‘revealed preferences’ as reflected in participation by WTO members in the DS
system, in DSB deliberations on the operation of the AB and in activities related to
maintaining an appeals mechanism should the AB become defunct – which led to
the creation of the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA)
in April 2020. Section 4 turns to the survey on insider perceptions and discusses the
relationship between participation in the survey and the pattern of engagement by
WTO Members in DS, the DSB and the MPIA. In section 5, we present the main
findings of the survey. In section 6, we recap the key points of this research, and
our main conclusions.
2 HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY
The deadlock on WTO dispute settlement has several characteristics:
-

-

-

First, it is AB-centred: the focus is on the operation of the second
instance review function. In fact, although some of the issues raised
matter for panels as well (e.g. overstepping the mandate; observing
statutory deadlines for issuing final reports), neither the US, nor
anyone else has tabled this issue;
Second, the US is the instigator. The US voice has strengthened
and intensified over the years, as it built up on its criticism of AB
practice to blocking appointments, and eventually leading the AB
out of business. The concerns regarding the operation of the AB is
not something recent, but the intensity of the US criticism has
increased over time;
Third, most of the time most of the WTO membership has been
passive in the sense of not engaging with the US critique, whether
in support or in opposition. This attitude changed with the realization that the US is willing to drive the AB out of business.

There are two broad hypotheses regarding possible systemic concerns associated
with the operation of the AB.1 First, that the AB has overstepped its mandate. This
1

Note that criticism of specific rulings in any given case is not evidence of systemic concern (such as
claims of overstepping the mandate). We do not focus on case-specific criticism, which clearly is
salient for the US, notably AB rulings regarding the use of zeroing in antidumping investigations.
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is the core element of US criticism and is disaggregated in various elements ranging
from the AB’s neglect of the deferential standard of review in antidumping
litigation to disrespecting the statutory deadlines for issuing reports. Second, that
the AB is not doing a good enough job, reflected in inconsistency of rulings and a
case law that lacks coherence, and thus does not provide the predictability governments and businesses need. This is the critique that academics usually raise
(Mavroidis, 2016), but not the US. In fact, the US wishes to downgrade the
importance of precedent, the quintessential element for securing predictability.
Insofar as acquiescence can be inferred from the absence of explicit disagreement with the US, this may reflect support for either or both hypotheses. Asking
countries to elucidate their views on this matter through a survey is the main
motivation for this article. We ask the question whether we are indeed facing a
widely shared concern regarding the performance of the AB, and the WTO
dispute settlement system in more general terms, as opposed to the deadlock
simply being an expression of the idiosyncratic policy towards trade and the
WTO taken by the Trump Administration. If there is little evidence for the
former there may not be a need to do much at this stage – Members may be
able to wait for a new US Administration.2 If there is evidence of more widespread
concern, there is a need to seriously address the matter as a priority issue.
The question whether the WTO DS, and, more specifically, the operation of the
AB has been a real concern to many WTO Members, is largely a black box. Many
suggestions on ‘what to do’ assume a large majority is happy with the status quo ante and
as a result seek to maintain as much of this as possible. This is the case for most proposals
made in the DSB, most clearly the proposal to expeditiously move forward with new
appointments to the AB. Throughout much of 2019 the US delegation to the WTO
stated it could not join a proposal, eventually joined by eighty-eight WTO Members
(counting the then twenty-eight EU Member States as one) to fill AB vacancies
expeditiously.3 On this matter, there is an abyss between the US and most of the
WTO membership. While some WTO Members might share some of the concerns
of the US, they differed on the question how go about addressing them. The overwhelming majority wanted to keep the AB in place while in parallel identifying ways to
improve its operation. This is now water under bridge. Following the demise of the AB
in December 2019 discussions to reconstitute the AB will need to start from scratch.
With this important caveat, our focus in this article is on trying to generate
information whether the concerns expressed by the US delegation to the WTO
are widely shared. We explore if others share the core issues raised by the US, and
2

3

Of course, this may well be wishful thinking given that Obama Administration was also unhappy with
the AB as are influential law firms and lobbyists. The problem may persist under a new US
administration.
See e.g. WT/DSB/W/609/Rev.14, (20 Sept.).
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whether there are distinct, additional matters that concern a broader cross-section
of stakeholders. Our null hypotheses are that:
-

-

the way the AB has been functioning is in disrespect of its institutional mandate;
this is not (regarded as) very relevant to most WTO members
because DS and the AB dispute has been mostly a matter that
concerns the biggest players, notably the EU and US; an
it is mostly a cottage industry that matters to ‘insiders’ such as
lawyers involved in cases and academics who study them.

Our aim is to better understand the attitude of both the Members which are active in
dispute settlement and debates, and those who are not. Members who do not engage in
debate also do not make much use of the dispute settlement system.4 Those who do not
respond to the survey also do have not used the DSU or engaged in DSB deliberations
on the AB. Why they do not do so may reflect various factors – including free riding
incentives, capacity constraints and simply lack of interest. Lack of interest may reflect
perceptions that the system is of little salience to them (to their exporters) because of the
remedies that are on offer, an inability to retaliate (the WTO is self-enforcing),
insufficient access to legal expertise, information asymmetries (a lack of knowledge
about injurious violations of WTO commitments, inadequate means for talking to their
firms), or a view that they have other means of solving trade conflict, either in the
WTO (committees) or elsewhere. The extant empirical research literature has shown
that that several of these factors are relevant in explaining use of the WTO. The survey
aims in part to get a better sense of perceptions of WTO stakeholders/practitioners
whether (and which) such factors play a role.
3 DATA
We use two sources of data. The first is based on participation by WTO Members in
the WTO. We focus on whether Members act as complainants in WTO dispute
settlement procedures as one indicator of engagement and ‘revealed preferences’ – a
presumption being that those who use the system (more) can be expected to engage
(more) in deliberations on reform and efforts to address the AB crisis. We have also
collected data regarding the frequency (number) of WTO Members’ interventions on
matters relating to the operation of the AB, and appointments of AB members, in the
regular meetings of the DSB. Our interest here is to identify the ‘frequent flyers’ and to
distinguish these WTO Members from those that have not acted as complainants
4

Maybe many of the countries who are silent in the DSB also do not notify, or ask questions in
committees, or engage actively in negotiations. Unfortunately, we have no data in these dimensions of
participation.
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(have not invoked the DSU by submitting disputes), and have not intervened in DSB
meetings regarding the performance of the AB. We have obtained information on use
of the DSU and participation in the DSB from the minutes of the DSB meetings.5 We
aggregate this data for the period between January 2017 and September 2019 by
counting how many times a given WTO Member speaks in the DSB on agenda items
concerning new appointments to the AB and the operation of the AB.6
We complement the data on DSB participation with an on-line, anonymous survey
comprising 35 questions ranging from satisfaction with the output of the AB to the
intensity of participation in dispute settlement to the capacity to do so. Fiorini et al. (2019)
lists all the questions asked and provides descriptive information on responses received.
The questionnaire design was informed by consultations and informal testing with several
experts and selected WTO delegations, and by our review of the extensive literature on
who uses WTO dispute settlement. The on-line survey ran for 3 months (mid-June to
mid-September 2019). The link to the online questionnaire was sent to all WTO
delegations with an accompanying email explaining the purpose of the exercise, requesting the survey link be forwarded to the relevant team in capitals as well as legal staff and
advisors in Geneva. The email and the survey instrument stressed that the software used
anonymized responses, making clear that the research team would not ask personal
information and would not have access to personal information (such as Internet
Protocol addresses) either. In addition to WTO delegations, the survey was also sent to
legal practitioners, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the Pacific
Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), and the WEF (World Economic Forum),
in all cases with a request to pass on the survey to others engaged in or concerned with
WTO dispute settlement. Figure 1 reports the number of survey respondents by professional affiliation.
A total of 168 responses were received. We count as ‘responses received’ all
cases where a respondent has answered to at least one question of the survey
excluding the ones about the respondent’s professional affiliation and the nationality
of her organization. Fiorini et al. (2019) reports the number of responses for each
question. Overall only 25% of the WTO member countries responded to the survey,

5
6

https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S001.aspx.
In several instances, a WTO Member speaks on behalf of a group of Members, many of which may in turn
intervene individually. We only count those Members that intervene. Mexico intervenes most frequently
in the 2017–19 period as a ‘speaker’ for other WTO Members. It did so seven times on behalf of Argentina,
Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Guatemala, Peru and itself as a proponent of WT/DSB/W/596 calling for the
launch of selection processes to replace departing AB members, and twenty times on behalf of a group of
Members supporting immediate new appointments to the AB, which eventually included 88 WTO
Members, counting the EU as one (WT/DSB/W/609 and its fourteen revisions). Nigeria and South
Africa intervened five times during this period on behalf of the Africa Group. Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Cuba and Ecuador took turns to speak on behalf of the GRULAC group of countries.
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Figure 1 Professional Affiliation of Survey Respondents

7

6

4
Academia

36
14

GVT capital
GVT Geneva
Not specified

15

Business association
Law firm
30

15

CSO/think tank
Other IO
EU institution
WTO staff

17
24

defined as a response by a government official based in Geneva or in the capital.7
Thus, most WTO members did not respond. Some non-responders are large and
systemically important. They are active in DS debates and presumably decided not to
respond to the survey. Non-responders include the United States, although nongovernment groups based in the US jointly comprised the largest number of distinct
responses from any country.8 The US is of course a very active user of the DSU and
participant in the DSB discussions on AB appointments. This is not the case for most
WTO members that did respond to the survey.
Response rates to similar surveys are often low, but in this case, the low level
of response is quite surprising. The questionnaire targeted a small group only – governments and professionals directly concerned with the issues addressed in the
survey. The subject (the imminent demise of the AB), was a high-profile issue in
the Geneva trade community at the time the survey was run. Potential reasons for
the low response rate could include a genuine lack of interest; lack of capacity;
7

8

We define WTO membership in calculating shares as a total of 136 members: 164–28 EU Member
States. Of the twenty-eight EU Member States, only six government officials (in Geneva or capitals)
responded to the survey.
Dominated by law firms, which accounted for 40% of US-based responses.
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time constraints; and/or deliberate decisions not to participate. A total of seventyeight respondents opened the survey but opted not to answer any of the questions.
Time constraints are not a likely factor explaining the low response rate, as the
survey was open for three months and took about ten minutes to fill in. Capacity
constraints are also not likely to be a factor, given that the survey was sent to
delegations that represent their countries at the WTO and the questions were simple
yes/no questions. Many of the respondents that did fill in the survey are from
developing countries, including Least Developed Countries (LDCs), also suggesting
capacity was not a constraint. Lack of interest or a perception that the matter on
which views were solicited (the AB, WTO DS) is not regarded to be of sufficient
importance seems likely. The potential salience of this hypothesis is strengthened by
the analysis of participation in WTO DSB deliberations in section 3 below.
The sample divides evenly between respondents located in high-income countries
as opposed to low- and middle-income nations. About one-third (32%) of respondents
are government officials.9 The geographic/national income distribution of respondents
across professional groups is heterogeneous. Almost 60% of the government respondents based in Geneva are from high-income countries, and less than half (eight
respondents) represent developing economies. The latter are relatively imbalanced by
geography: two-thirds (six respondents) represent Latin American countries. Only one
African and one Asian Geneva-based official completed the questionnaire.
A similar pattern emerges for capital-based government officials. The share located
in high-income countries drops to little less than 50%, while those located in developing
nations account for almost 50% of responses. Four capital-based government officials did
not specify their nationality. Inverting the pattern observed for responses by Genevabased delegations, developing country officials in capitals are predominately from Africa
(all but one of all respondents in this category who indicated their nationality). No
Geneva-based official from India completed the survey, but one capital-based official
from that country did. No government official representing the United States or China
responded. We do not know the location of EU Commission respondents (Geneva or
Brussels).10 Twelve of the fifteen respondents affiliated with law firms are based in highincome countries, with the majority located in North America and Brussels; one is based
in India. Conversely, almost half of all business-affiliated respondents are based in
developing countries. 35% of academic and Civil Society Organizations (CSO) respondents are based in developing economies.
9

10

The coverage of government views may be greater than this as some respondents who did not identify
a professional affiliation are likely to be retired officials. The majority of respondents in this ‘not
specified’ group indicated that they are based in a high-income country.
We arbitrarily count all respondents indicating they work for an EU institution to the category of
capital-based government officials for some of the analysis that follows but report this group separately
as well.
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4 REVEALED PREFERENCES: PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO
The main players in world trade are China, the EU and the US. One expects these
large trade powers to figure prominently in the total number of trade disputes and
therefore also to engage actively in deliberations on the operation of the DSU and
the AB. In this Section we briefly characterize participation by WTO members on
these different dimensions of DS.
PARTICIPATION

4.1

IN TRADE DISPUTES

The three major trading powers – the US, China, and the EU – accounted for onethird of the total number of DS cases launched in the 2017–19 period, which is our
reference period as it coincides with the apex of the crisis at the AB (Table 1). Most
complaints were brought by large WTO members – two thirds of the total involved
countries (blocs) with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) exceeding USD 1 trillion.
Overall, only twenty-five of 136 WTO members (counting the EU28 as one)
brought at least one complaint, of which seventeen launched more than one.
Thus, almost 20% of the membership brought a dispute in a three-year period;
some 80% of the membership did not.11
Table 1

Use of WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures: Complainants, 2017–19

USA
China

11

Complaints
2017–2019

GDP
(Current
USD bn)

Globalization Index

GDP per Capita Share of
(Current USD, World
Thousand)
Exports (%)

12
6

20,494
13,608

82
64

62.6
9.8

9.9
18.6

EU

5

18,749

n.a.

36.5

15.7

Canada
South Korea

5
4

1,709
1,619

84
79

46.2
31.4

3.0
4.5

Russia
Ukraine

4
4

1,658
131

72
74

11.3
3.1

2.7
0.4

Qatar

4

192

73

69.0

0.4

Japan

3

4,971

78

39.3

5.2

Countries engaged in foreign policy conflicts that have generated trade policy disputes – Russia,
Ukraine and Qatar are examples – account for one-sixth of disputes in 2017–19.
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Complaints
2017–2019

GDP
(Current
USD bn)

Globalization Index

GDP per Capita Share of
(Current USD, World
Thousand)
Exports (%)

Brazil

3

1,869

59

8.9

1.7

Mexico
Vietnam

2
2

1,224
245

71
64

9.7
2.6

3.2
1.7

UAE
Australia

2
2

414
1,432

74
82

43.0
57.3

1.1
1.9

Turkey

2

767

71

9.3

1.3

Tunisia
Venezuela

2
2

40
482

67
54

3.4
16.1

0.1
0.2

Chinese
Taipei
India

1

n.a.

24.0

2.7

1

589
2,726

61

2.0

2.3

Switzerland
Thailand

1
1

706
505

91
71

82.8
7.3

2.3
1.7

Indonesia

1

1,042

63

3.9

1.5

Norway
Argentina

1
1

435
519

86
66

81.8
11.7

0.9
0.5

Guatemala

1

79

63

4.5

0.1

Average
GDP
(current
USD bn)

Average p.c.
GlobalizatiGDP (current
on Index
USD ‘000)

Share of
world
exports

3048

72

27.1

83.5

70

58

8.6

14.3

Complainants
Non-complainants

Note: Shares of world exports are computed considering the EU as a single entity and
therefore accounting only for extra-EU trade.
Source: WTO and World Development Indicators. Trade data are from CEPII BACI data12
and WTO Trade Policy Review (TPR) 2018 Trade Profiles of Chinese Taipei, Botswana,
Eswatini, Lesotho and Namibia for which bilateral trade is not reported in the BACI data.

12

The BACI (acronym of “Base pour l’Analyse du Commerce International”: Database for International
Trade Analysis) database managed by the French think tank CEPII (Centre d’Études Prospectives et
d’Informations Internationales) is available online at: http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/
presentation.asp?id=37.
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This observation is not specific to the period considered. Johannesson and Mavroidis
(2016) and Leitner and Lester (2017) report data on use of WTO dispute settlement
starting in 1995 and document that the large trading powers bring a disproportionate
number of complaints. Updating the Johannesson and Mavroidis dataset to the end of
October 2019, the US and the EU acted as complainants in 129 and 102 of the total
590 complaints, and were defendants in 155 and 85 cases, respectively. This observation ties well with the finding in Horn et al. (2005) that the volume of export trade is
the best predictor of the number of DS complaints brought by WTO Members. In
general, complainants tend to be bigger, more open, and more integrated in trade
(as measured by the Globalization Index) and richer than non-complainants.13
4.2

DELIBERATIONS

ON THE

AB

IN THE

DSB

Turning to participation in discussions on AB appointments and DS reform in the
DSB, we observe a less concentrated picture. Table 2 reports the number of times
Members intervened in the DSB on the need for AB appointments and the procedures
linked to appointing a new AB member during 2017–2019. Thirty-seven WTO
Members (27%) intervened five or more times in the DSB on these agenda items
during 2017-19 – the period in which the US blocked new appointments. Eighty-two
(60%) did not intervene at all – a percentage that is less than the share of WTO
Members that did not launch DS cases during this period. Virtually all WTO Members
that brought a DS case during 2017–19, also participated in DSB debates during this
time – the only exceptions are Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates. As is the case
with users of the DSU, participants in DSB discussions on AB appointments are larger,
more open and richer than non-participants, but we also observe more engagement by
smaller and poorer countries. As noted previously, in some instances a country spoke
on behalf of a group. This is the case in particular for Mexico, who intervened
regularly in DSB meetings on behalf of the proposal by a large group on Members
to launch the process for new AB appointments. Although more than a dozen
countries with trade shares below 0.1% of world trade, including several African
LDCs,14 participated in DSB deliberations, the general pattern is one of countries in
Africa and the Middle East engaging less than developing countries in other regions.
There is a marked difference between the period of the negotiation of the
Uruguay round, and today. The bulk of the negotiation in the Uruguay Round on

13

14

We use the overall index for 2016 of the KOF Globalization Index, a composite index measuring
globalization for every country in the world along the economic, social and political dimension. See
Gygli et al., The KOF Globalisation Index – Revisited 14(3) Rev. Int’l Org. 543–74 (2019).
Neither of the two LDCs with the largest export shares (Bangladesh and Cambodia) spoke in the DSB.
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the DSU involved an EU–US back and forth, although several other members played
a role, and on occasion a decisive one. Canada, for example, was instrumental in
bringing about the AB as discussed in Hoekman and Mavroidis (2019). Nevertheless,
only the EU and the US voiced their claims with respect to every provision that
ultimately found its way into the DSU. Conversely, today numerous WTO members
have expressed their views, often on more than one occasion, regarding the workings
of the DSU.
Table 2

WTO Members with Five or More DSB Interventions on the AB
Total
Interventions
2017–2019

GDP
(current
USD bn)

Globalization Index

GDP per Capita Share of
(Current USD,
World
‘000)
Exports (%)

Mexico

66

1,224

71

9.7

3.2

USA
EU

52
48

20,494
18,749

82
n.a.

62.6
36.5

9.9
15.7

China
Canada

43
43

13,608
1,709

64
84

9.8
46.2

18.6
3.0

Australia

39

1,432

82

57.3

1.9

Japan
Brazil

37
35

4,971
1,869

78
59

39.3
8.9

5.2
1.7

New
Zealand
Norway

33

205

78

42.0

0.3

31

435

86

81.8

0.9

Singapore
Switzerland

30
29

364
706

83
91

64.6
82.8

1.7
2.3

South Korea

28

1,620

79

31.4

4.5

Chinese
Taipei
India

28

589

n.a.

24.0

2.7

26

2,726

61

2.0

2.3

Hong Kong
Chile

23
23

363
298

68
77

48.7
15.9

1.0
0.6

Turkey

20

767

71

9.3

1.3

Russia
Thailand

19
16

1,658
505

72
71

11.3
7.3

2.7
1.7

Pakistan

13

313

54

1.5

0.2
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Total
Interventions
2017–2019

GDP
(current
USD bn)

Globalization Index

679

GDP per Capita Share of
(Current USD,
World
‘000)
Exports (%)

Uruguay

13

60

73

17.3

0.1

Colombia
Costa Rica

12
12

330
60

64
72

6.7
12.0

0.3
0.1

Honduras
Ecuador

12
11

24
108

63
60

2.5
6.3

0.1
0.1

Guatemala

11

79

63

4.5

0.1

Venezuela
South Africa

11
9

482
366

54
70

16.1
6.4

0.2
0.7

Indonesia
Philippines

7
7

1,042
331

63
67

3.9
3.1

1.5
0.7

Panama
Ukraine

7
6

65
131

72
74

15.6
3.1

<0.1
0.4

Peru

6

222

69

6.9

0.4

Argentina
Egypt

5
5

519
251

66
63

11.7
2.5

0.5
0.2

Cuba

5

97

59

8.5

<0.1

Average
GDP
(current
USD bn)

Globalization Index

Average p.c.
GDP (Current
USD ‘000)

Share of
World
Exports

All participating WTO
Members (N ≥ 1)

1,492

67

18.2

90.3

Non-participating Members
(N = 0)

41.7

56

7.9

7.5

Note: Mexico is the most frequent participant due to its role as sponsor of a proposal that
over time came to be supported by 88 WTO members (counting the EU as one) calling for
new appointments to the AB. Shares of world exports are computed considering the EU as
a single entity and therefore account only for extra-EU trade. N denotes number of
interventions.
Source: Dispute Settlement Body – minutes of meetings (WT/DSB/M/*) and World Bank
World Development Indicators. Trade data are from CEPII BACI data and WTO TPR
2018 Trade Profiles of Chinese Taipei, Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho and Namibia for
which bilateral trade is not reported in the BACI data.
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THE MULTI-PARTY INTERIM APPEAL

ARBITRATION ARRANGEMENT

(MPIA)

In the course of 2019, as it became more evident that efforts to induce the United
States to cease blocking new appointments to the AB would not be successful,
several WTO Members, led by the European Union, began work on a ‘plan B’
centred around putting in place a substitute mechanism that could be used on a
voluntary basis by those WTO Members desiring to be able to continue to appeal
the findings of panels. This resulted in the establishment of the MPIA in April
2020.15 The MPIA was the fruit of a negotiation between the EU and several other
heavy users of the WTO dispute settlement system and is intended to operate as an
interim appeals board until the AB crisis is definitively resolved, one way or another.
Paragraph 1 of the MPIA makes clear it will remain in place as long as the AB
remains defunct. The key features of the MPIA are that it replaces Articles 16.4 and
17 of the DSU (MPIA §2) and retains the core elements of Article 17 of the DSU
(MPIA §3). The value of the arrangement rests on decisions by signatories to appeal
a panel report. If no party appeals a panel report addressing a dispute between MPIA
signatories, the parties agree to adopt it at the DSB by negative consensus (MPIA
§8). Any WTO member may participate in the arrangement (MPIA §12).
As of 21 May 2020, twenty one WTO members had signed on to the MPIA:
Australia; Brazil; Canada; China; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Ecuador, the European
Union; Guatemala; Hong Kong, China; Iceland; Mexico; New Zealand; Nicaragua;
Norway; Pakistan; Singapore; Switzerland; Ukraine and Uruguay. By signing on the
MPIA these WTO members reveal a strong preference for maintaining an appeals
option as part of WTO DS. Signatories span the two largest global traders – China
and the EU – as well as several frequent users of WTO DS. Jointly the signatories
represent 14% of the membership, counting the EU as one. Disputes between MPIA
signatories accounted for about a quarter of the total DSU case load during 1995–2019.
While this is significant, as noteworthy is that it is nonetheless a relatively low number.
Argentina, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Russia, the United Kingdom, all
WTO members with significant experience in WTO dispute settlement, did not join
the club. At the time of writing no case had yet been submitted to the MPIA and it not
possible to assess how it will be used and whether other WTO members will join.
5 INSIDER PERCEPTIONS: THE SURVEY
Turning to the survey results, of the 136 WTO members (counting the EU as one), a
key feature is that only twenty-five governments responded, i.e. at least one
15

The MPIA builds on Art. 25 of the DSU, which makes provision for arbitration of disputes among
WTO members if all parties agree and notify their decision to pursue arbitration to the WTO. The
DSB circulated the text of the MPIA as WTO Doc. JOB/DSB/1/Add.12 (30 April 2020).
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official – whether Geneva- or capital-based – filed in the questionnaire (Table 3).16
Across all professional groupings and including instances where no professional affiliation
was provided (i.e. not specified), the responses span forty-eight countries.17 For thirteen
of these countries responses where received from business representatives or law firms.
Table 3

16
17

WTO Members with at Least One Government Official Responding to the
Survey
GDP
Globalization
(current USD bn) Index

GDP per Capita
(Current USD,
Thousands)

Share of World
Exports

EU

18,749

n.a.

36.5

15.7

France
Canada

2,778
1,709

87
84

41.5
46.2

NA
3.0

South Korea

1,619

79

31.4

4.5

Belgium
Chinese
Taipei

532

91

46.6

NA

589

n.a.

24.0

2.7

India
Switzerland

2,726
706

61
91

2.0
82.8

2.3
2.3

Vietnam
UAE

245
414

64
74

2.6
43.0

1.7
1.1

Australia

1,432

82

57.3

1.9

Austria
Brazil

456
1,869

89
59

51.5
8.9

NA
1.7

Czech Rep.
Sweden

244
551

85
90

23.1
54.1

NA
NA

Hungary

156

85

15.9

NA

Norway
Israel

435
370

86
77

81.8
41.6

0.9
0.4

Chile
New Zealand

298
205

77
78

15.9
42.0

0.6
0.3

Guatemala

79

63

4.5

0.1

We count the EU as one here and disregard responses by EU Member State officials.
This total includes individual EU Member States.
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GDP
Globalization
(current USD bn) Index

GDP per Capita
(Current USD,
Thousands)

Kenya

88

55

1.7

<0.1

Costa Rica
Paraguay

60
41

72
63

12.0
5.9

<0.1
0.1

Venezuela
Tanzania

482
57

54
51

16.1
1.1

0.2
<0.1

Cote d’Ivoire

43

53

1.7

0.1

Zimbabwe
Uganda

31
28

51
53

2.1
0.6

<0.1
<0.1

Burkina Faso
Malawi

14
7

52
49

0.7
0.4

<0.1
<0.1

Average GDP
(Current USD
bn)

Globalization
Index

Average p.c.
GDP
(Current USD
‘000)

Share of World
Exports

71

25.7

39.7

63

13.9

58.1

Responding
1,194
govts
Nonrespondi494
ng govts

Share of World
Exports

Note: EU Member States in italics. Shares of world exports are computed considering
the EU as a single entity and therefore accounting only for extra-EU trade. Because
of this the shares of world exports for EU Member States are not applicable (NA).
The export shares in the last two rows do not account for EU Member States.
Source: Survey and World Development Indicators. Trade data are from CEPII BACI
data and WTO TPR 2018 Trade Profiles of Chinese Taipei, Botswana, Eswatini,
Lesotho and Namibia for which bilateral trade is not reported in the BACI data.

Focusing on government responses and comparing the WTO members that
participated with those that did not, we once again observe that the relatively
larger, more open (integrated) and richer countries participated more on average.
However, compared with DSU and DSB participation, the differences between
the two categories are less. More small countries are represented, and fewer large
economies, reflecting the absence of responses from government officials from
China, Japan and the United States. Large emerging economies such as Mexico,
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Russia, Indonesia, and Argentina that are active in the DSU and DSB did not
participate in the survey at all.
A commonality across the three sources of data is that, most countries in
Africa and the Middle East did not engage.18 Asian countries, on the other hand,
participated less frequently in the survey than in the DSB/DSU. Only thirteen of
the twenty-five WTO Members that were DSU complainants in 2017–19 had
government officials fill in the questionnaire. Of the thirty-seven WTO members
that intervened at least five times in DSB discussions on AB appointments and DS
reform, only fourteen had government officials that responded to the survey.
In order to further investigate the relationship between participation in the
system and survey participation, we have estimated the simple correlation between
the country-level binary indicator, taking value one if at least one government
official of the country took the survey (Government respondent dumm), and two
dummy variables taking value one respectively if the country acted as complainant
at least once between 2017 and 2019 (Complainant dummy), and if it intervened at
least once during the same period in the formal discussions on AB appointment,
DSB reform and related policy issues (Intervention dummy). The correlation
between Government respondent dummy and Complainant dummy is equal to
0.3585, while the correlation between Government respondent dummy and
Intervention dummy is 0.2914. These correlations are both relatively low, indicating
that responses by governments to the survey are not dominated by WTO members
that are active participants in the DSU and DSB discussions.
6 SURVEY FINDINGS
In a nutshell, the survey responses suggest two main conclusions:
-

-

18

First, the WTO Membership as such, seems quite happy with the
current design of WTO DS. There are no major qualms regarding
the basic features of the DSU.
Second, some of the WTO Membership is quite concerned with
the manner in which the AB has exercised discretion within the
current DS design. With respect to practice, the best way to
describe the reactions of the Membership is ‘polarization’: some
Members signal concerns, while many others do not see much
wrong with the output of the AB.

We again have seven African countries participating, although the composition of this group changes
relative to the DSB sample: the largest African economies that do participate in the DSB (South Africa
and Nigeria) did not respond to the survey.
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This suggests practice rather than design is at issue. The purpose of this article is
not to analyse the drivers or the rationale for the different views let alone whether
they make sense or not. On the other hand, we do observe that the US is in a
minority of one when it comes to deciding on the optimal course of action to
address its concerns. While some WTO Members are ready to acknowledge that
some of the issues raised are worth debating, none is prepared to support the US in
its decision to prevent new appointments to the AB. The proposal by 88 members
to complete the AB by electing new members, and the total isolation of the US in
this regard, clearly illustrates this divide.
6.1 CONSENSUS

ON MANY DIMENSIONS

Large majorities of respondents have, through their responses to survey
questions,19 stressed that the AB, as such, and the WTO DS in more general
terms, is of critical importance to the functioning of the world trading system.
For political economy reasons, governments may have the incentive to renege
on negotiated commitments. Enforcement is necessary because the GATT (and
the other agreements coming under the aegis of the WTO, which largely
emulate the GATT approach to trade liberalization), is an incomplete contract.
Since re-negotiation is very onerous (in light of the number of participants,
their heterogeneity, the consensus working practice, etc.), adjudication may be
perceived as the only feasible option to ‘complete’ the contract and allow it to
produce its intended results.20 The persuasion that the DSU is of utmost
importance to the trading community is underscored by many responses to
survey questions. Here we highlight the most salient ones where there is broad
agreement (see Figure 2):
-

19

20

The AB impasse is of systemic importance, and it is not simply a
tiff between EU and US (Q1);
WTO DS is not just a matter of power, but serves important
functions of interest to the world community irrespective of size
of litigants (Q19);

The question numbers in parentheses (Qx) refer to the survey instrument and are reported to facilitate
cross-referencing with the detailed descriptions of the questions asked and responses received provided
in M. Fiorini et al., WTO Dispute Settlement and the Appellate Body Crisis: Detailed Survey Results (2019),
https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/index.php?id=22&no_cache=1&L=-1&tx_rsmbstpublications_
pi2%5Bitemuid%5D=6561.
This arguably is too narrow a view given that other forms of dispute resolution are available to WTO
Members, such as raising specific trade concerns in Committees. Bolstering the use of such alternative
mechanisms to defuse conflicts and resolve concerns is arguably one important dimension of WTO
reform.
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Figure 2 Virtual Consensus on Key Dimensions of the DSU

10%

12%

88%

90%

Yes

Yes

No

No
N=164

N=160

Panel A: [Question 15] A compulsory and binding
dispute settlement system and automatic adoption
of reports is a necessary feature of the trade system

Panel B: [Question 1] The Appellate Body impasse
largely concerns the EU and the US, so we are
staying out of it.

9%

13%

87%

Yes

91%

Yes

No

No
N=160

N=159

Panel C: [Question 14(1)] DS is valuable for legal
clarification; to create a precedent

Panel D: [Question 14(3)] DS is valuable for ensuring
predictability

4%

8%

92%

96%

Yes

Yes

No

No
N=160

N=162

Panel E: [Question 14 (4)] DS is valuable for
enforcing commitments

Panel F: [Question 11] Does the WTO need the
Appellate Body to ensure coherent case law?
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-

-

-

Alternatives to the current DS are not a substitute to the existing
regime (Q21);
Panelist appointments have been objective and unbiased (Q9);
Panel reports should be binding. The world community thus,
continues to support negative consensus, the most important highlight reform agreed during the Uruguay round (Q10; Q15);
WTO adjudicators should be very circumspect in interpreting the
WTO rules (Q3);
DS/AB is valuable for legal clarification, creating precedent, ensuring predictability, enforcement of commitments (Q14s1; Q14s3;
Q14s4); and
The AB must provide coherent case law (Q11).

There is an important qualification to make with respect interpreting revealed
preferences as reflected in responses to the survey as it does tell us anything about
the views of the countries that did not respond to the survey. Those who decided
not to fill in the questionnaire and countries that do not use the system may have
different assumptions on these issues. The many non-respondents may be at the
opposite end from those actively engaged in the system.
We turn next to a discussion of reactions to questions regarding practice of the AB.
6.2

DISAGREEMENTS

AND POLARIZATION

A substantial number of respondents believe DS is not doing what it should be
doing, and/or is not consistently delivering high quality output (Figure 3).
Notwithstanding a large majority view that panelists are appointed through an
objective process (Q9), 55% of respondents (seventy-seven out of 139 who answered
this question) believe that panel reports are sometimes biased. 70% of Geneva based
officials who are involved in DS take this view, as do over 50% of officials based in
capitals (Q30).21 Overall, 42% of respondents believe the AB has gone beyond its
mandate, violating the quintessential obligation established in the DSU (Article 3.2)
to not undo the balance of rights and obligations as struck by the Membership.

21

Some potential implications of views by a non-negligible share of insiders/stakeholders that there is a quality/
competence problem are addressed in Hoekman and Mavroidis (2019; 2020b)B. Hoekman & P.C.
Mavroidis, Burning Down the House? The Appellate Body in the Centre of the WTO Crisis in 21st Century
Trade Policy: Back to the Past? (EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2019/56) (B. Hoekman & E. Zedillo eds,
Washington DC: Brookings Institution 2019) and B. Hoekman & P. C. Mavroidis. To AB or Not to AB?
Dispute Settlement in WTO Reform, EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2020/34 (2020b).
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Polarization

32%
44%
56%
68%

Yes

Yes

No

No
N=157

N=141

Panel A: [Question 30] Are panel reports sometimes
biased?

Panel B: [Question 12] Has the Appellate Body in
fact provided coherent case law?

42%

45%
55%

58%

Yes

No

Yes

No

N=155

Panel C: [Question 13] Has the AB always acted
consistently with the DSU?

N=165

Panel D: [Question 2] Has the AB gone beyond its
boundaries?

38%

62%

Yes

No
N=144

Panel E: [Question 31] Do you think that AB reports are written by the Secretariat?
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This provision encapsulates the idea that panels and the AB are agents not
principals, and they must abide by the agency contract, which they have adhered
to. Nevertheless, because of the ‘incompleteness’ of the original contract, this
emerges as probably the hardest discipline to observe. In case of egregious violations, it might be easy to pronounce in favour of disrespect of the mandate. But
most issues raised are borderline cases. This is precisely what might explain why,
notwithstanding the agreement of some with the US on this score, there is
disagreement of all with the US on the appropriate course of action to address
the situation.22
6.2[a] Unpacking Agreement and Disagreement
With regard to the professional affiliations of those who took the survey, it is
notable that government officials based in Geneva involved in DS, and practitioners in law firms, have expressed the view that the AB has gone beyond its
mandate (50% and 60%, respectively) (Q2) (Figure 4).
Many business respondents and legal practitioners believe that the AB has
not provided coherent case law (40% and 50%, respectively). 30% of officials in
capitals dealing with DS think the AB has not provided coherent case law
either (Q12). Finally, 44% of respondents believe the AB has always acted
consistently with the DSU (Q13). The two issues (consistency with the DSU,
coherence) are not necessarily mutually exclusive: one can imagine a consistent
with the DSU incoherent case law, as the AB could be adopting for example a
more or less deferential standard of review when dealing with say consumer
protection cases.
More than three-quarters of delegation officials based in Geneva who are
directly involved in DS, agree that the AB has at times acted inconsistently with
the DSU. Insiders (those involved in DS and thus presumably better informed) are
less positive than others (Q13). In part, this critique implicates the Secretariat as well.
61% of all respondents (eighty-seven out of 142) think that AB reports are written by
the Secretariat. This share is higher for respondents who work on DS, as 80% of law
firm respondents and officials based in Geneva adhere to this view. Capital based
officials are the outlier here: ‘only’ 40% agree with the statement (Q31).

22

An equally tantalizing question is whether the Membership should focus on ex post or ex ante
remedies to redress the current situation, We did not include questions to this effect in the survey,
since this is the bridge we should be crossing assuming consensus to sit down and talk. For now, there
is none.
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Figure 4 Unpacking Polarization
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Table 4 offers a graphical representation of agreement/disagreement patterns among responses to questions across types of respondents (i.e. different
professional affiliations).23 The rows of the table report the main questions
with a Yes/No answer structure. Columns report professional affiliations. For
a combination of question and professional affiliation, if the group-specific
average response is statistically higher (lower) than the average response of all
other respondents, the respective cell in the table is coloured white (black). If
the group-specific average response is not statistically different from the
average response of all other respondents, then the cell is coloured grey.
For each row (question), the same colour for two or more columns reflects
agreement among the respective groups of respondents.
The analysis comprises the following steps. First, responses to the questions
with a Yes/No answer structure are recoded to take the numeric value 0 if
‘No’ and 1 if ‘Yes’. Second, for each group of respondents (defined based on
professional affiliation) we compute (i) the group-specific average response,
taking the average of individual numerical responses within the group; and (ii)
the average response of all other respondents excluding respondents from that
group. Third, we test the relationship between (i) and (ii). If, for a given
group and a given question, (i) is statistically higher (lower) that (ii), that
group will be on average more (less) in favour to the statement expressed in
the question than all other respondents. Thus, ‘agreement’ is defined as
instances where two or more groups have group-specific average responses
that demonstrate the same relationship with the average response of all other
respondents. The nature of these relationships is estimated using mean difference analysis with a statistical significance of 95%.
Some suggestive patterns emerge from Table 4. On the question whether
the AB has gone beyond its mandate (Q2), government officials in Geneva
and law firms tend to agree which each other and with this proposition more
than other groups, differing in particular with capital-based officials (including
the EU) who are more inclined to answer no to this question. This pattern
repeats for the question whether panelists are objective and panel reports are
unbiased ((Q9; Q30) and whether the WTO Secretariat writes AB reports
(Q31): Geneva-based officials tend to be more skeptical than capital-based
officials are. Geneva delegates also less inclined than other groups to agree
that the AB has always acted consistently with the DSU (Q13) and that DS is
valuable for legal clarification and to create precedent (Q14:1). The latter
suggests that Geneva officials may be more inclined to regard the role of DS
23

Fiorini et al., supra n. 18, provides granular information on responses to questions across professional
categories.
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Q1: The AB impasse largely concerns the EU and US, so we are staying out of it
Q2: Has the Appellate Body gone beyond its boundaries?
Q3: WTO adjudicators should exercise great circumspection in interpreting the WTO
Q4: We prefer bilateral consultations to using a “court” for inter-governmental
agreements
Q5: Free trade agreements offer a better forum to resolve disputes
Q6: Has your country considered arbitration instead of WTO DS procedures?
Q7: Does the WTO need a mediation mechanism?
Q8: My country does not launch disputes if others have larger interests at stake than
us
Q9: Panelists appointed to dispute settlement panels are objective and unbiased
Q10: Should WTO panel reports be binding?
Q11: Does the WTO need the Appellate Body to ensure coherent case law?
Q12: Do you think that the Appellate Body has in fact provided coherent case law?
Q13: Has the Appellate Body always acted consistently with the DSU?
Q14(1): Dispute settlement is valuable for legal clarification; to create a precedent
Q14(2): Dispute settlement is valuable for being alternative to negotiations
Q14(3): Dispute settlement is valuable for ensuring predictability
Q14(4): Dispute settlement is valuable for enforcement of commitments
Q14(5): Dispute settlement is valuable for punishing cheaters
Q14(6): Dispute settlement is valuable for securing a mutually acceptable solution
Q15: Compulsory & binding DS with automatic adoption of reports is necessary
Q16: When officials in capitals assess if a new policy is consistent with WTO rules, do
they pay attention to Appellate Body rulings?
Q17: Does your delegation/ministry use WTO monitoring or Global Trade Alert data to
identify trade barriers that could give rise to a dispute or a specific trade concern?
Q18: Does your government analyze other Members’ trade policy notifications that
could lead to a question in a WTO committee?
Q19: Disputes are irrelevant as conflicts are settled by the power of the bigger market
Q20: Dispute settlement is too expensive for my country
Q21: Dispute settlement is not relevant because we use alternative mechanisms
Q23: Our businesses are well-informed about foreign market access barriers
Q24: Our businesses complain to the trade ministry about foreign market access
barriers
Q25: Our businesses don’t know if market access problems are due to foreign policies
Q26: Do your WTO representatives intervene in DSB meetings?
Q28: Does your country only intervene in the DSB if direct export interests are
affected?
Q29: Do your country’s DSB interventions address broad systemic issues?
Q30: Are panel reports sometimes biased?
Q31: Are Appellate Body reports written by the Secretariat?
Q32: Should there be a page limit for Appellate Body reports?
Q33: Should there be page limits on appeals by WTO Members?
Q34: Would monetary damages enforceable in domestic courts boost interest in WTO
dispute settlement?

Not specified

Other Intl Org.

EU Inst.

Academia

CSO / T. tank

Business Ass.

Law firm

GVT capital

Note: all questions are Yes/No. If a group-specific average response is statistically higher (lower)
than the average response of all other respondents the respective cell is colored white (black). If
a group-specific average response is not statistically different from the average response it is
grey. For each row (question), the same color for two or more columns reflects agreement
among the respective groups of respondents.

GVT Geneva

Table 4 Agreement/Disagreement Within and Across Questions
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procedures as resolving disputes than other groups – e.g. business respondents
and law firms who tend to take the view that DS should punish ‘cheaters’
(viz. Q14:15).
Business representatives tend to be more negative than average on whether
panelists are objective and unbiased (Q9), on whether their governments use
WTO monitoring and notification information: a majority of business respondents
believe their governments do not analyse other countries trade policies with a view
to raising a question in a WTO body (Q18). In other work, Wolfe (2020a)
comments on the propensity of Members to raise a ‘specific trade concern’ or
ask a question about another Member’s notification. What we find in the survey
suggests that the business perception is not wrong: countries with sophisticated
alert systems and good internal coordination receive more comments from industry
and other ministries hence launch more disputes, raise more STCs and ask more
questions than other Members.
Business representatives are also more skeptical about the value of the DSU in
delivering outcomes: they are more inclined to believe that power determines
outcomes (Q19), that the DS is too expensive (Q20), and that alternative mechanisms, including consultations and PTA fora are better or preferable (Q4, Q5, Q21).
Business is an outlier in that a significant share of respondents agreeing that DS is
irrelevant because conflict resolution reflects power relationships (Q19). We are
not surprised by the results, as large businesses have the means to raise their
concerns directly with a government without waiting for a WTO dispute settlement process to conclude.
Some 60% of business respondents prefer bilateral consultations over the
WTO ‘court’ (40% in the case of associations in high-income nations; 100% of
those based in developing countries) (Q4). Consistent with this is that business is
somewhat more positive about PTAs as a forum to address disputes than other
stakeholders, especially associations based in developing countries (Q5). Some
business respondents are an outlier in stating that WTO DS is not relevant because
alternative mechanisms are used (Q21). 50%-60% of business respondents think DS
is a valuable alternative to negotiations, vs. 30% of government officials in capitals
expressing this view (Q14s2). Business is the only group consistently taking the
view that one role of DS is to punish ‘cheaters’ (Q14s5).
Law firms tend to agree more strongly with the statements that the AB has
gone beyond its mandate (Q2), that panel reports should be binding and adopted
automatically (Q10; Q15), that governments use WTO notifications to raise issues
in WTO meetings (Q18), intervene in DSB meetings (Q26), and do so to address
matters of systemic concern (Q29). Not surprisingly, law firm respondents are
among the most supportive of WTO DS as opposed to alternatives, a perspective
that is reflected in their active engagement in support of the creation of the MPIA.
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Several major law firms hosted dozens of meetings and conferences on the MPIA
in and outside Geneva during 2019 and early 2020.
Respondents working in academia are neutral on key questions such as AB
overreach (Q2), whether the AB should show great circumspection (Q3), on the
use (utility) of PTAs and bilateral consultations to resolve disputes (Q4, Q5) or
whether the AB should and does provide coherent case law (Q11, Q12). They
tend to agree more strongly that panel reports should be binding (Q10), that the
AB has tended to act consistently with its mandate (Q13), and that a role of the AB
is to clarify the rules (Q14(1)). They also believe that businesses are not well
informed about market access barriers and do not complain to trade ministries
(Q23; Q24) – two questions where governments take a relatively strong opposing
view. Finally, academics are an outlier in being the only group to take a relatively
positive view of the prospect that introducing monetary damages (remedies) would
bolster interest in using the DSU (Q34).
6.3 DETERMINANTS

OF

DS

UTILIZATION AND ENGAGEMENT

Fiorini et al. (2019) reports other cuts of the data that are salient to our hypotheses.
One is to distinguish between respondents based on their location – developing vs.
high-income countries. Another is to distinguish between respondents based on
whether they are (have been) involved in WTO DS or not.
Poor vs. rich countries: Respondents in poor countries:
-

-

Are more inclined to agree that DS is too expensive (Q20);
prefer bilateral consultations over the WTO court (Q4), perceive
that PTAs (preferential trade agreements) are better forum to
resolve disputes (Q5);
believe that making available monetary damages as a remedy in DS
cases would be desirable (Q34); and that
their country tends to free ride, wherever and whenever it is
possible to do so (Q8).

There are also clear splits across the rich-poor divide regarding:
-

the question whether businesses are well-informed on foreign
market access barriers (rich: yes; poor; no) (Q23);
whether they are aware if policy is a cause of market access
problems (rich: yes; poor: no) (Q25);
whether their delegations intervene in the DSB (rich: yes; poor:
many say no) (Q26); and,
if so only do so to protect export interests (rich: no; poor: >50%
say yes)
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Distinguishing between developing country and high-income countries is thus
informative in revealing differences of view. Much of what the data reveal is
consistent with theory and past empirical research. 70% of government officials
in capitals of developing countries, for instance, agree that their country does not
launch disputes if other parties have larger interests at stake. This compares with
less than 20% for government respondents in capitals of high-income countries
(Q8). Moreover, 60% of Capital-based officials and all business respondents agree
their country free rides in DSB meetings.24
Differences in views depending on involvement in DS: Many of the views
expressed by respondent groups are not sensitive to the question whether a
respondent has (had) direct involvement in the WTO DS. But on some questions, there are differences, and on occasion, pronounced differences. In part, this
finding presumably reflects differences in knowledge of how the process works,
but differences may also reflect differences in preferences. Questions where there
are differences in views include preference for bilateral consultations and PTA
mechanisms to deal with trade disputes (Q4; Q5), where those involved in WTO
DS are somewhat less inclined to agree that these alternatives offer a better forum
than those who are not. Insiders are also less likely to agree that their country will
tend to free ride on others (Q8) and more likely to agree that panelist appointments are sometimes biased (Q9). Particularly striking is the difference on Q20
(is DS too expensive), where those involved in DS tend to say No and those not
involved are more likely to agree (which may help explain why they are not
users). This difference may reflect better knowledge of insiders but may also
reflect self-interest. Similarly, on Q26 (does your country intervene in DSB
meetings), insiders are much more inclined to agree than those not involved in
DS. Finally, insiders are much less supportive of adoption of monetary damages as
a remedy.
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The main takeaway from the stylized facts regarding the use of the DSU and
participation in DSB deliberations, as well as the survey response rates is that WTO
DS is primarily of significant interest to the major trade powers, more open and
richer countries. Most WTO members are missing in action, even when that
taking action would have an opportunity close to zero – i.e. filling in a survey
that takes about ten minutes to complete. We interpret this as reflecting limited
interest in – and concern about – the continued operation of the AB. We are
skeptical that the high survey non-response rate and limited participation in the
24

The questions regarding freeriding are not included in Table 4 given the low response rates.
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DSB reflects capacity constraints. More likely is that the limited engagement is
reflects small stakes; free riding; and/or perceptions that WTO DS is of limited
utility.
The survey results suggest that when it comes to fundamental questions
regarding the role, scope, and design of WTO DS procedures there is a virtual
consensus across WTO Members and stakeholders (of course, conditional on the
self-selection associated with those who responded). There is agreement that the
two-stage process that was negotiated in the Uruguay Round is what is needed and
that an appeals body is desirable. Although we refrained from asking about specific
issues that have been raised by the United States and that are the focus of the
Walker process – in order to allow the questionnaire to be filled in by trade
officials and stakeholders who are not inside the ‘DS kitchen’ but do deal with the
WTO – the survey responses also suggest that the US is not alone in considering
that the AB has at times gone beyond its mandate. Moreover, many stakeholders
have concerns that go beyond the AB and pertain to WTO DS more broadly,
including the first (panel) stage, the preconditions that need to be satisfied in order
to participate/use the DSU, and the salience of other dispute resolution processes,
both within the WTO (committees; STCs) and outside the WTO (bilateral
consultations; use of PTAs).
The data suggest close to consensus on the basic design of the DSU as crafted
in the Uruguay Round, but significant polarization in perceptions on the performance of the AB. Although as of October 2019 a total of eighty-eight WTO
members (counting the EU as one) had signed on to the proposal to appoint new
AB members expeditiously, this leaves forty-seven WTO members that have not
expressed such a view. Most of these countries are small or poor, but there are a
few outliers, notably Japan.25 The differential participation in the MPIA also
suggests polarization and differences in perceptions and revealed preferences across
the membership: many frequent users of DS did not sign on and it remains to be
seen whether they will do so.
It is not the purpose of this article to propose solutions to the AB deadlock.
Responses to our questionnaire do not suggest a solution (respondents were not
asked to do so) but is seems clear that there are substantive questions that need to
be addressed if the Appellate Body impasse is to be resolved. The survey responses
suggest that efforts to do so need to involve greater willingness by WTO Members
to identify and discuss substantive concerns about the operation of the system. It
25

In DSB meetings Japan has supported the proposal – e.g. the DSB meeting of 28 January 2019 – but
Japan has not formally joined the proposal. Instead it has stressed that DSB is tasked with achieving a
satisfactory settlement of disputes and urged Members to further discuss this matter in the DSB as well
as ‘other issues with regard to the proper functioning of the dispute settlement mechanism in due
course’ (WTO JOB/DSB/3, 18 April 2019).
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bears repetition, that the purpose of this article is to reveal the preferences of the
stakeholders in an effort to clear the air as to who thinks what about the working
of the WTO dispute settlement.
Members need to reflect on the current institutional design of DS processes
and the operation of the DSU, including the quality of panelists/AB members, the
support they are given, and putting in place meaningful performance review
procedures. Some of these matters have been the subject of discussion in the
long-standing review of the DSU. The state of play in efforts to review and update
DS procedures were summarized by Ambassador Coly Seck (Senegal) in June 2019
in a 123-page document (TN/DS/31) providing his overall assessment of the
ongoing negotiations on DS reform. The need for consensus has impeded a
resolution on the matters raised. Some of the more fundamental issues that emerge
from the survey are not even on the table in these long-running negotiations.26
As argued elsewhere, internal working practices are a core part of any WTO
reform agenda (Hoekman, 2019; Wolfe 2020a,b). When it comes to the DSU, it is
also important is to consider whether there is a need to address the factors that
underlie the lack of interest by most WTO members in the DSU. Insofar as the
majority do not see DS as being useful to them, this reduces the value of membership and the benefits of a rules-based trading system. In separate work we raise
similar concerns about participation in the alternative form of managing conflict in
the WTO, by raising a specific trade concern (Wolfe, 2020a). The survey data and
the revealed preferences discussed in this article suggest there is strong support for
de-politicized trade dispute settlement. This suggests WTO members should
determine whether an appeals function is necessary to attain this objective.
Hoekman and Mavroidis (2020a, 2020b) note there are options that require little
in the way of reform to the DSU that would allow the system to fulfill its purpose
without an AB.
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